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Ethics Part 4 by Benedictus De Spinoza

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would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence 
of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of 
man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself 
all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite 
power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that 
man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended 
towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the 
last Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all 
individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be 
capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely 
through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have 
shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite 
power of God, and consequently (I:xvi.) from the necessity of the divine 
nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given 
man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of 
extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I:xxi.) 
that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.
It is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save 
those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to 
his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and 
that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things 
demands.



Prop. V. The power and increase of every 
passion, and its persistence in existing 
are not defined by the power, whereby we 
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, 
but by the power of an external cause 
compared with our own.

Proof.- The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our 
essence alone (III:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), the power of 
a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves 
endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II:xvi.) must 
necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared 
with our own. Q.E.D. 



Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion 
can overcome the rest of a man's activities or 
power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately 
fixed to him. 

Proof.- The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in 
existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with 
our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV:iii.) it can overcome a 
man's power, &e. Q.E.D.



Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled 
or destroyed by another emotion contrary 
thereto, and with more power for controlling 
emotion.

Proof.- Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea, 
whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence 
than before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of 
Part III.) When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the 
body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power 
of activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body 
(IV:v.) receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being; 
which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II:vi.), 
in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to 
(III:v.) and stronger than itself (IV.Ax.); wherefore (II:xii.) the mind 
is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to, and stronger than 
the former modification, in other words, (by the general definition 
of the emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and 
stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy the 
existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor 
controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.

Corollary.- An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can 
only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of 
the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing. 
For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an 
emotion contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the 
general Definition of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification 
of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we 
undergo.



Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil 
is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure 
or pain, in so far as we are conscious 
thereof.

Proof.- We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the 
reverse in preserving our being (IV:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), 
when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity. 
Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or 
pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil

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Ethics Part 4 by Benedictus De Spinoza

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